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Abstract—The evolution of electrical grids, both in terms of
enhanced ICT functionalities to improve efficiency, reliability and
economics, as well as the increasing penetration of renewable
redistributed energy resources to favor sustainability of the
production and distribution of electricity, results in a more sophis-
ticated electrical infrastructure which poses new challenges from
several perspectives, including resilience and quality of service
analysis. In addition, the presence of interdependencies, which
more and more characterize critical infrastructures (including
the power sector), exacerbates the need for advanced analysis
approaches, to be possibly employed since the early phases of
the system design, to identify vulnerabilities and appropriate
countermeasures. In this paper, we outline an approach to model
and analyze smart grids and discuss the major challenges to be
addressed in stochastic model-based analysis to account for the
peculiarities of the involved system elements. Representation of
dynamic and flexible behavior of generators and loads, as well
as representation of the complex ICT control functions required
to preserve and/or re-establish electrical equilibrium in presence
of changes (both nominal ones, such as variable production by
a photovoltaic energy source, and failures/disruptions both at
electrical and ICT level) need to be faced to assess suitable
indicators of the resilience and quality of service of the smart
grid.
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK
Smart grids aim at evolving the traditional electrical grid
system by introducing sophisticated ICT control functionalities
to improve efficiency, reliability and economics, as well as the
increasing penetration of renewable distributed energy resources
to favor sustainability of the production and distribution of
electricity. This results in a more sophisticated electrical infras-
tructure which poses new challenges from several perspectives,
including resilience and quality of service analysis. In addition,
the presence of interdependencies, which more and more
characterize critical infrastructures (including the power sector),
exacerbates the need for advanced analysis approaches, to be
possibly employed since the early phases of the system design,
able to represent and master an integrated vision of the entire
system, seen as a system of systems with intricate relationships
among them.
Stochastic model-based analysis [1] is widely applied as
an early validation technique in a variety of studies, including
those focusing on resilience and, in general, quality of services
properties. Its reduced cost, compared to measurement-based
methods, makes it an attractive alternative to analyze a system
towards identification of weaknesses and vulnerabilities, so that
means to enhance system robustness can be identified and put
in place. To account for interdependencies existing among the
major infrastructures composing an electrical power system, the
system model needs to include all the involved components, to
trace the propagation of phenomena affecting individual parts.
The resulting complexity needs to be managed from several
perspectives, including resorting to an appropriate abstraction
level of the involved structural and behavioural aspects, as well
as promoting modular and compositional approaches to model
development.
In this paper, we address the analysis of smart grids in terms
of indicators representative of their resilience as perceived by
final customers as well as distribution system operators. The
results of this kind of analysis can be exploited to understand
the dynamics of failures and potential system vulnerabilities,
against which appropriate countermeasures need to be identified.
The objective of the work is to build a general and composable
modeling framework, populated by template building blocks
which represent models of components/events, so as to be
able to account for a variety of grid configurations and
critical situations characterized by failure events, in presence of
interdependencies. Fulfilling such objective requires significant
effort, both in resources and time, and is part of the contri-
bution planned by the ongoing European project SmartC2Net
(https://intern.smartc2net.eu). The current developments tackle
the work from a logical and systematic angle, by i) identifying
the abstracted system architecture to be modeled, whose
components are characterized by both a state and a behaviour;
ii) introducing relevant analysis indicators; and iii) exploring
modeling approaches able to trade between efficiency of the
solution and accuracy in modeling a variety of smart grid
configurations and sophisticated control functionalities. The
challenges raised by the dynamic and flexible behaviour (as
shown by renewable energy resources and by categories of
loads at the medium and low voltage level), as well as by the
crucial electrical production-consumption equilibrium in the
smart distribution grid are discussed, with reference to their
implications on the modeling and solution approach. These
are fundamental steps towards a sound modeling and analysis
framework for smart grids.
Previous studies have pursued similar objectives, but focus-
ing on interdependencies at the level of the electric transmission
grid, such as [2]–[5]. Although we get inspiration from previous
experience with modeling the transmission segment, here we
account for the volatility of the microgrid generation and newly
appliances to control and manage distribution of electricity
to medium and low voltage loads. With reference to the
distribution grid, most of the proposals in the literature address
the modeling of cyber attacks to reveal vulnerabilities, perform
impact analysis and assess the cyber risk, e.g. [6]–[8]. Our
framework targets a wider characterization of the fault model,
including both accidental faults, affecting either the ICT control
infrastructure or the electric grid, and cyber attacks to the
ICT control, in addition to a special focus on the reciprocal
dependencies originating failure cascading effects. Simulation
studies also offer an alternative approach able to account for
both the electrical grid and the smart ICT control for analyzing
the dynamics and mutual impacts of both domains, such as
[9], where however the focus is on the evaluation of real-time
performance indicators, while our objective is to assess a wider
class of resilience and QoS indicators, explicitly accounting
for failures and their propagation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the main logical components of the smart grid to be
considered in the modeling framework, the characterization of
their state and their relationships. Section III describes the fault
model assumed, as well as the interdependencies due to the
interconnections among the electrical distribution grid and its
control subsystem. A set of resilience-related metrics of interest
for the analysis is included in Section IV, while discussion and
identification of the approach to build the modeling framework,
with preliminary exemplifications using the SAN formalism
are carried on in Section V. Finally, conclusions are drawn in
Section VI.
II. LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE SMART GRID SYSTEM
In this section, we describe the main logical components of
the smart grid (SG) to be considered in the modeling framework
and their relationships. The proposed logical structure of the SG
has been derived from the description of the architecture [10]
and of the use cases [11]. The focus is on SG at level of
electrical distribution systems.
The considered SG is logically structured in two cooperating
parts, as shown in Figure 1a: the Electric Infrastructure (EI)
and the Monitoring and Control System (MCS) based on the
Information and Communications Technologies (ICT).
A. The Electrical Distribution Infrastructure
The EI represents the electrical infrastructure, which is
responsible for generating electric power at medium and
low voltage, and for transporting towards the final users the
electric power received from the transmission system and
generated at medium and low voltage. The EI is structured
in two segments: (i) MV-EI: the medium voltage electrical
distribution infrastructure (with an operating voltage of 10kV-
60kV) physically connected to the high voltage (HV-EI) and
low voltage electrical infrastructures. (ii) LV-EI: the low voltage
electrical distribution infrastructure (with an operating voltage
of 220V-380V), physically connected to MV-EI. MV-EI and
LV-EI can be logically structured in:
• Power stations (generators), i.e., sources of energy con-
nected at substations to supply energy to the distribution
network.
• Load stations (loads), i.e., equipment connected at substa-
tions to extract energy from the distribution network.
• Substations, i.e., an assembly of elecrical equipment that
allows the routing and control of electricity across the
network [12], e.g., substations control the voltage and
direction of electricity; they generally have switching,
protection and control equipment, and transformers; substa-
tions themselves do not usually have generators, although
a power plant may have a substation nearby; other elecrical
devices such as capacitors and voltage regulators may also
be located at a substation.
• A combination of the above items (these components will
be referred as substations), e.g., a logical component of
MV-EI can be composed by a generator, a load and a
substation where a capacitor bank is located.
• Power lines, i.e., the electrical circuits (e.g., overhead lines
and cables), connecting stations and substations.
From a topological point of view, the infrastructures MV-EI
and LV-EI can be considered like networks, or graphs, as shown
in the example of diagram of Figure 1b.
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Fig. 1. Logical scheme of EI (a), example of logical scheme of MV-EI with
radial topology (b) and logical scheme of an arc of MV-EI and LV-EI (c).
The topology of the network is typically a radial graph,
Figure (1b) or, for redundancy purposes, a partially/weakly
meshed (e.g., loop/ring, selective or spot) graph. An arc (or
branch) of the graph represents a power line with the associated
switch and protection breakers, if any, while a node represents
a power station, a load station or a substation (or a combination
of them). Substations (nodes of the network) of MV-EI directly
connected to the HV-EI through high-voltage power lines,
are primary substations, i.e., substations that reduce the high
voltage to a voltage suitable for MV-EI. Substations of LV-EI
directly connected to the MV-EI through medium-voltage power
lines, are secondary substations, i.e., substations that reduce
the medium voltage to a voltage suitable for LV-EI. In MV-EI,
high-voltage transmission lines feeding a primary substation are
considered like power sources connected directly to the primary
substation (on the primary bus of the transformer); low-voltage
distribution lines feeding secondary substations are considered
power loads connected directly to the secondary substation. In
LV-EI, medium-voltage distribution lines feeding a secondary
substation are considered like power sources connected directly
to the secondary substation.
The logical structure of a generic arc is shown in Figure 1c,
where a power line (PL) with the associated protection
units, including breakers, and the associated switch (SW) are
considered. Changing the state of a switch, it is possibile to
reconfigure the distribution system, in order to modify the
topology of the network.
For simplicity of representation, each generic node, repre-
senting a station or substation, can be structured like a bus-
bar (bus) with the associated elecrical equipment. Figure 2
shows the logical scheme adopted for a generic node of MV-
EI. Protection units (including breakers), which are physically
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Fig. 2. Logical scheme of a node of MV-EI. In a real world instance of the
node, only a subset of the components connected to BUS is considered.
part of a substation, are not explicitally represented in the
considered logical scheme, but they are implicitely included in
the logical components. The logical structure of a specific power
station, load station or substation may be obtained considering a
subset of the logical components associated to the generic node,
depending on the real structure of the considered component.
At the level of abstraction considered, the logical structure of
a generic node of MV-EI is based on the following components:
• Bulk generators (BG): classic no dispersed generators can
produces elecrical energy in bulk quantity.
• Distributed generators (DG): volatile small-scale energy
generating units, producing electricity from, for example,
renewable energy sources (RES), i.e., wind, hidro, biomass,
solar/photovoltaic, etc.
• Flexible distributed generators (FDG): generators that
offer flexibility in the power profile, e.g., shifting in time,
changing the energy amount or changing the tariff [13].
• Non flexible loads (L): classic loads for which a loss of
power is a blackout, because the power demand cannot
shift in time or change in the required energy amount.
• Flexible loads (FL): loads that offer flexibility in the power
profile, e.g., shifting in time (i.e., shifting loads to less
expensive time slots), changing the energy amount or
changing the tariff; for flexible loads the loss of power
is not a blackout if the power profile can shift in time;
examples of flexible loads are: electrical charging stations
(ECS) or charging spots (CS) (depending on the considered
level of detail), enterprises, etc.
• Distributed storage units (DS): electrical devices that
can be considered alternatively (flexible) generator or
(flexible) load, depending on the state of the power system;
they can be placed near to renewable energy systems to
smooth their generation profile, or they can be directly
operated by the distribution system operators (DSO) to
enhance network performances, i.e., to help to supply
peak power and to improve power quality (e.g., through
voltage regulation) [14], [15]. “In general, energy storage
systems use electricity during non-peak hours or from
intermittent sources, and the stored energy is converted
back to electricity for the loads during peak periods; the
price difference between energy during peak and off-peak
hours is the main motivation for installing DS units” [16],
• Transformers with On load tap changers (OLTC): trans-
formers having voltage regulators at primary substations.
• Voltage regulators (VR).
• Capacitor banks (CB): voltage regulators based on the
injection of reactive power.
Generation, energy storage and load systems that are connected
to a power distribution system are defined as generic distributed
energy resource (DER).
The logical structure of a generic node of LV-EI is based
on the following components:
• DG, FDG, DS, L, FL (like electrical vehicle charging,
that can be used by the local DSO to manage power
quality control in the LV grid along with decentralized PV
production as well as other loads, e.g. households [17]),
Transformer (T) having off-load tap changers.
• Micro/mini generators (MG): volatile small-scale energy
generating units, producing electricity at lower voltage
levels, e.g., from wind, solar/photovoltaic, etc.; MG are
under the customer domain and, in conventional systems,
can not be remote controlled by an operator; in the
following it is assumed that MG can be remote controlled
by an operator.
Traditionally, OLTC, capacitor banks and remotely controlled
switches are not available at LV-EI, therefore, only controlling
load and active power injection, can voltage be kept within
regulatory limits [18]. Consequently, OLTC, voltage regulators
and capacitor banks are not considered in the logical scheme
of the node, although, it can be extended to include them.
B. The Monitoring and Control System based on the Informa-
tion and Communications Technologies
The MCS represents the system that monitors and controls
the physical parameters of the electric infrastructure, and
triggers appropriate reconfigurations when needed (e.g., in
emergency situations). The main objectives of the MCS are:
• to balance production and consumption as locally as
possible in order to avoid transmission losses,
• to increase transmission reliability, through ancillary ser-
vices such as voltage/var support, switches reconfiguration,
generator redispaching and load shedding.
Control and automation functions are no longer limited to
control center and appear throughout the network. They are
hierarchically organized, with control layers corresponding to
the main voltage levels. Thus, MCS is hierarchically structured
in three main logical components, shown in Figure 3:
• CMCS: grid central management and control systems,
that, at the considered level of abstraction, include internal
systems (DSO Operation and Enterprise Centers, Demand
Management Control, Tariff Management, TSO) and
external systems (Weather Forecast, Aggregator Controller,
Distribution Market, Information Service and Charging
Station and Routing Reservation).
• MV-MCS: medium voltage monitoring and control system,
• LV-MCS: low voltage monitoring and control system.
All the control operations performed by MCS on EI are not
represented in detail, but a simplified model is considered
where only the effects on the distribution grid of the mitigation
methods to cope with EI malfunctions, namely generation
redispatch, load shedding, grid reconfigurations or voltage/var
control are accounted for. Figure 3 depicts a possible detailed
logical structure of MCS. The components CSYS, MVGC,
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Fig. 3. Detailed logical scheme of MCS.
LVGC and LC differ for the locality of their decisions and can
exchange grid status information and control data over public
or private networks (INTERNET, WAN and AN). The main
functions of the component MVGC and LVGC are:
• to monitor their assigned area in order to diagnose faults
in the electrical/control components,
• to choose the most suitable corrective actions to restore
the functionality of the grid, in case of faults.
Since they are not directly connected to the controlled compo-
nents, the corrective actions are put in operation through the
pertinent logical controller (LC), i.e., an ICT-based component
having the ability to monitor/control an electrical component.
LC guarantee the correct operation of each controlled compo-
nent (generators, loads, storage units, etc.) and reconfigure it
in case of fault of some apparatus. At the level of abstraction
considered, LC includes the data acquisition and control
equipment (sensors and actuators) and also smart meter or
Customer Energy Management System (CEMS), if needed.
At medium voltage, one MVGC is associated to each
different primary substation. MVGC monitors and controls all
the medium-voltage electrical components connected (directly
or indirectly) to the primary substation, i.e., the components
located along the feeders emanating from the primary substation,
and that can be remotely controlled by an operator. At low
voltage, one LVGC is associated to each different secondary
substation. LVGC monitors and controls all the low-voltage
electrical components connected to the secondary substation. At
medium and low voltage, an LC is associated to each electrical
component that can be directly controlled by an LC. Therefore,
at each substation (corresponding to a node of the EI network)
at medium and low voltage is associated: one logical component
MVGC, or one logical component LV GC or one or more
logical components LC.
Figure 4 shows all the electrical components, at low voltage,
under the direct control of an operator. The logical component
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Fig. 4. Detailed logical scheme of LV-MCS.
MVG represents the power source corresponding to a medium-
voltage distribution line feeding a secondary substation. MVG
is not under the direct control of LVGC, that receives the
set points for MVG from MVGC. It can be assumed that,
LC can operate in: (i) isolated/independent/non-coordinated
mode, (ii) coordinated/central mode, or (iii) both isolated and
coordinated mode.
Isolated mode occurs when each device is controlled
independently, without regard for the resulting consequences of
actions taken by other control devices [19] (traditional aproach
used for voltage/var control devices); i.e., the LC operation
is not coordinated with the other LC operations and new set
points for the component controlled by LC can be defined
independently by the operation (i.e., set points) of the other
LC. With the isolated mode, a new timely, though inconsistent
or suboptimal, configuration for EI can be obtained without
the intervention of LVGC and MVGC (and CSYS).
Coordinated mode occurs when the operations of all the
LC that control the components located along the feeders
emanating from the same primary or secondary substation, are
coordinated [20], respectively, by the MVGC or LVGC (with
the contribution of CSYS) associated to the substation. With
the coordinated mode, a new consistent and (more) optimal,
though less timely or delayed, configuration for EI can be only
obtained with the intervention of LVGC or MVGC.
Both isolated and coordinated modes occur when a new
(timely, though inconsistent or suboptimal) configuration for EI
is first obtained without the intervention of LVGC and MVGC,
and next, a new (optimal, though delayed) configuration for EI
is obtained with the intervention of LVGC or MVGC.
No LC is associated to electrical components that are not
under the direct control of an operator; the state of these
electrical components (e.g., the value of voltage) can change
as a result of a reconfiguration of the controlled electrical
components. If an electrical component can be controlled only
in isolated/non-coordinated mode, then the associated LC is not
connected to MVGC or LVGC by a communication network.
Finally, notice that, since different electrical components can
be associated on the same node of the EI network, then
also different LC can be associated to the same node of the
communication network.
MCS actions can be abstracted at one or two levels on the
basis of the locality of the EI state considered by MCS to
decide on proper reactions to disruptions: (i) single LC local
level (isolated mode): only the state local to the affected EI
component is considered by each involved LC, (ii) MVGC/
LVGC global level (coordinated mode): the state global to all
the affected EI system under the control of MVGC/LVGC is
considered. Each level of the MCS actions is characterized by:
• an activation condition, specifying the events that enable
the MCS reaction: disruption/faults, intermittency of
renewable sources, power demand variation, etc.,
• a reaction delay, representing the overall computation and
application time needed by MCS to apply a reconfigura-
tion,
• a reconfiguration strategy (RS), based on generation
redispatch (varying the generated power), load shedding
(varying the load demand), voltage/var control, load
balancing, power loss reduction, line overload reduction,
etc.
The reconfiguration strategy RS defines how the configuration
of EI changes when MCI reacts to an event that has compro-
mised the electrical equilibrium. For each level, a different
reconfiguration function can be considered.
C. State Definition
The state of EI is an hybrid-state composed by a discrete
part and a continuous part. To represent the discrete part the
following entities have to be considered:
• an oriented graph TG, representing the topology of EI
(as shown for example in Figure 1b), i.e., nodes and arcs
with the associated components (as shown for example in
Figures 1c and 2) and the direction of the current flow on
each power line,
• the quantities representing the possible discrete settings
of the electrical control devices, like those used to VOLT/
VAR control (OLTC, capacitor banks, etc.), i.e., for
example, the value on/off for each capacitor and the tap
position for each OLTC (over the number of available tap
positions) considered in EI,
• the discrete quantities representing the correct behavior or
failed bahavior/outage (due to an accidental or intentional
fault) of the electrical components.
To represent the continuous part of the EI state the following
quantities have to be considered: (i) the physical quantities V ,
δV , I , P and Q associated with the equipment that constitutes
the electric infrastructure (generators, loads, busses, power
lines, etc.), i.e., respectively, voltage, voltage phase angle,
current flow, active and reactive power, (ii) other quantities
representing the possible continue value settings of the electrical
devices different by those described in the above item (if
any). Each state of EI can be described as a function of the
entities described above. The state of MCS can be considered
discrete, in the sense that it is only composed by discrete values.
These values have to represent mainly the correct behavior or
failed beviour (due to an accidental or maliocious fault) of the
electrical components. Possibile values are: working, failure,
omission failure, repairing, etc.
D. Characterization and Behavior of Electrical Components
In this section, the parameters/quantities, the characteri-
zation and the behavior of the main electrical components,
that are considered in the proposed modeling framework, are
presented and discussed.
1) Buses: Voltage Vh(t), phase angle of the voltage δV,h(t),
active power Ph(t) and reactive power Qh(t) are associated
to the bus h at time t. In order that voltage variation may not
degrade the customer voltage supply quality, feeder voltage
should be maintained within the permissible range [20], [21],
i.e.:
Vh(t)− Vh(t) ≤ Vh(t) ≤ Vh(t) + Vh(t),
with 0 ≤  ≤ 1 (usually, rated voltage +/−10%, corresponding
to  = 0.1). When the voltage profile of a component reaches
the statutory upper or lower limit, then individual protection of
the component will trip for overvoltage/undervoltage causing
the voltage to drop. This can propagate through the network
causing other components to trip aggravating even more this
problem and further reducing system voltage. The values of
Ph(t), Qh(t), Vh(t) and δV (t) can be influenced by various
factors, these being the power injection and absorption at bus
h by generators and loads (or storage), the current through the
lines connected to node h, the power injection and absorption
at bus h by voltage and reactive power control devices.
2) Power Lines: Maximum power flow Imaxl that a power
line can carry whitout being overloaded (capacity), power flow
Il(t), impedance Zh (representing all forms of opposition to
power flow), voltage drop ∆Vl and line power loss ∆Sl are
associated to the power line l (PLl) at time t. When, at time t,
the power flow exceedes the capacity, i.e., if Il(t) > Imaxl , then
the line is overloaded. The overload, if not removed through
a reconfiguration of EI, can lead to the trip of the line (if
the power line protections open the line breaker) or to the
disruption of the line (if the breaker fails to open); in the case
of permanent disruption the repair of the power line is required.
3) Non Flexible Loads: The quantities considered for a
non-flexible load on the bus i (Li) at time t are: constant or
variable power demand Di(t); power demand forecast DFi (t);
tariff/price (cost for the customer or reward for the operator)
of the supplied electrical energy CDi (t); rated voltage V
D
i ;
actual power demand PDi (t) (active power) that is met (the
power is supplied by no flexible and flexible generators); actual
voltage Vi(t) on the load; reactive power QDi (t); and load
power demand that is not met UDi(t) = Di(t)− PDi (t), due
to an outage occurred in EI or a fault in MCS (a measure
of a cost or blackout for the final customer or user). The
quantity DFi (t), that can be considered a random variable as a
function of the time t, i.e., a stochastic process, represents the
load forecast system. The quantity Di(t)−DFi (t) represents
a measure of demand forecast error for the load associated to
node i.
4) Flexible Loads and Flexibility Patterns: The quantities
considered for a flexible load on the node i (FLi) at time
t are the same as those for the non-flexible loads described
above, except that the power demand D(t) is flexible. The
power flexibility of the power demand can be exploited in three
dimensions: time, energy amount or tariff for the user or the
cost for the operator. For flexible loads, the power demand
that is not met UDi(t) could not be considered a blackout
for the final customer, or it could represent a cost lesser than
that corresponding to a blackout, depending on the flexibility
pattern adopted for Di(t).
A flexibility pattern represents the fexibility of a load in
terms of intervals of time for which UDi(t) is (or is not) a
blackout, or in general a cost, for the customer/operator, based
on the tariff/cost associated to each interval.
A first flexibility pattern is described by FPDi (t) =
(Di(t), (t1, l1), (t2, l2)), where:
• Di(t) is the (constant or variable) power demand required
at time t,
• (t1, l1) and (t2, l2) are the non-overlapping time intervals,
• in the first time interval (t1, t1 + l1) the power demand
that is met PDi (t) could be also less than Di(t),• in the second time interval (t2, t2 + l2) PDi (t) must be
equal to Di(t).
Therefore, in (t1, l1) UDi(t) is not a cost/blackout for the final
customer, on the contrary in (t2, l2) UDi(t) is a cost/blackout
for the final customer.
A second flexibility pattern is described by FPDi (t, w) =
(Di(t), w, (t1, l1, w1), (t2, l2, w2), . . . , (tm, lm, wm)), where
m different tariffs w1, . . . , wm, are considered for m different
non-overlapping and consecutive time intervals, respectively,
(t1, l1), . . . , (tm, lm). The customer agrees on the tariff
w = wh. Then, in the time intervals where a tariff w or lower
than w is valid, i.e., for each (tj , lj), such that, wj ≤ w, the
customer requests the satisfaction of the demand Di(t); thus,
in case the demand is not satisfied, a cost/blackout is incurred.
On the contrary, in the time intervals where a tariff greater
than w is valid, i.e., for each j, such that wj > w, the actual
power demand (active power) that is to met PDi (t) could
be also less than Di(t); in this case, the lack of satisfied
demand is not perceived as a blackout/cost. Notice that,
another period of time with the corresponding tariff can be
included, by considering the period complementary to the
first m intervals, i.e., a tariff wm+1 for each time t, such that
t < t1 or tj + lj < t < tj+1, for j = 2, . . . ,m− 1, or t > tm.
This second example is a generalization, based on the tariff,
of the first example of flexibility pattern.
A third flexibility pattern extends the previous one by
introducing the constraint that the cumulated power demand
required in an interval (t, l) by the load i, i.e., PD,cumi , must be
equal to Dcumi . In this case, P
D,cum
i =
∑
h=1,...,m+1 P
D,cum
i,h ,
where PD,cumi,h is the cumulated power by the load i in the
interval (th, th + lh). Depending on the state of EI and on the
tariffs wh associated to each interval, the best configuration
(with respect to a cost function) can be considered for
PD,cumi,1 , . . . , P
D,cum
i,m+1 , such that P
D,cum
i = D
cum
i , if possible.
Otherwise, in the worst case the total demand Dcumi has not
been completely satisfied at the expiration time t+l, a blackout/
cost is incurred. A more general case is obtained, when different
(also overlapping) time intervals with different total power
demands are considered, each power demand having different
level of criticality.
5) Non Flexible Generator: The quantities considered for a
non-flexible generator on the bus i (Gi) at time t are: maximum
active and reactive power Pmaxi and Q
max
i that a generator
can supply; actual active and reactive power PGi (t) and Q
G
i (t)
generated at time t (depending, for renewable generation,
from the weather conditions), with 0 ≤ PGi (t) ≤ Pmaxi and
0 ≤ QGi (t) ≤ Qmaxi ; voltage Vi(t); generation forecast GFi (t)
at time t (for renewable generation in controlled area based on
weather forecast); tariff (or cost to generate electrical energy)
CGi (t). Like for loads, for renewable generation the quantity
GFi (t) is the stochastic process representing the generation
forecast system. The quantity PGi (t) − GFi (t) represents a
measure of generation forecast error for the generator Gi.
Values for the generated power PGi (t) are based on the current
power demand at time t. Thus, PGi (t) should be equal to the
power GDi (t) required by the loads and supplied by Gi. For
non-flexible generators, PGi (t) cannot be controlled/changed,
thus when the power demand GDi (t) changes, then voltage
drop can occur on the node i; in this case, if the voltage is
not maintained within the permissible range, then the generator
can trip.
6) Flexible Generator: The parameters associated to a
flexible generator on the bus i (FGi) are the same as those
for the non-flexible generators, except that the generated
power PGi (t) is flexible. Like for loads, the generated power
flexibility can be exploited in: i) time, ii) energy amount
or iii) tariff for the user or the cost for the operator. For
flexible generators, PGi (t) can be controlled and changed,
thus when the power demand GDi (t) changes, then new set
points for PGi (t) can be applied. For renewable generators,
PGi (t) depends on the weather conditions. Thus, variations
of the weather conditions determine new values for PGi (t).
When PGi (t) changes, new set points for EI could be required,
depending on the difference between the new value of PGi (t)
and the old power demand GDi (t) supplied by the generator.
In particular, if PGi (t) > G
D
i (t) then options for the exceeding
generated power PGi (t)−GDi (t) could be:
• it is lost (a cost for the operator),
• it is stored into (distributed) storage units (possibly on the
same bus of the generator, if any),
• it is supplied to reconfigured flexible loads (such as
electrical vehicles, that can accept higher demand),
• it is supplied to non-flexible loads, replacing the (non-
renewable) energy produced by a bulk generator (redis-
patch of the generated power is required),
• a combination of the above items, depending on the current
capacity of the available distributed storage units and on
the availability of flexible loads.
For PGi (t) ≤ GDi (t) the options for the exceeding power
demand GDi (t)− PGi (t) could be:
• the power demand GDi (t)− PGi (t) is not met (a cost for
the final customer and for the operator),
• it is supplied by (distributed) storage units (possibly on
the same bus of the generator, if any),
• it is shifted over time, if it is required by flexible loads,
• it is supplied by another generator (redispatch of the
generated power is required),
• a combination of the above items, depending on the
current capacity of the available storage units and on
the availability of flexible loads.
7) Distributed Storage Unit: The quantities associated to a
distributed storage unit (battery) on the bus i (DSi) are: storage
capacity, i.e., the current amount of electric charge DSci (t)
stored at time t (represents the maximum amount of energy
that can be extracted from the battery under certain specified
conditions), with 0 ≤ DSci ≤ DScmaxi ; maximum capacity
DScmaxi , i.e, the maximum amount of electric charge it can
store; size DSsizei (the maximum power, typically ranges in
1-10 MW); autonomy DSautoi (requested in the 10-100 minutes
range); efficiency (charge/discharge rate); and expected lifetime
(cycles) [14]. Storage units can act as:
• generator: when it can supply energy, if DSci (t) > 0,• load: when it can receive exceeding generated energy, if
DSci (t) < DS
cmax
i .
They can be associated to distributed generators to reduce the
variability of the volatile generation. It is assumed that storage
units are operated directly by the Distribution Company in
order to increase network control capabilities [14].
8) OLTC: The main quantities considered for an OLTC
on the bus i (OLTCi) are: rated capacity COLTCi , in MVA;
primary V 1i and secondary V
2
i voltages; voltage correction
per tap ∆Ui; number of tap positions N
taps
i ; integer tap
position N tapi , with N
mintap
i ≤ N tapi ≤ Nmaxtapi ; initial tap
position N tapiniti , at time 0; tap selection time T
tapsel
i , i.e., the
time required to move from one tap position to the next one,
that is usually comprised between 3 and 10 seconds; percent
impedance IZi, in %; voltage correction factor CFVi ; active
POLTCi and reactive Q
OLTC
i power injected on the bus i.
9) Capacitor Bank and Voltage Controller: The quantities
considered for capacitor bank (CBi) and voltage control (V Ci)
on the bus i are, respectively: reactive power QCBi injected/
absorbed by CBi on the bus i; and voltage V V Ci injected or
absorbed by V Ci on the bus i.
III. FAULT MODEL AND INTERDEPENDENCIES BETWEEN
EI AND MCS
The fault/failure model assumed for EI and MCS is based
both on the effects of the faults on the state of EI and both on
the accidental and malicious cause of the failures. All faults
and failures that may affect a system during its life can be
classified according to different basic viewpoints, as shown
in [22]. The main failures of (single or multiple) electrical
components of the EI could be summarized in:
• Failures involving only the electrical quantities of the
components: overloads of power lines, voltage variation
outside the regulatory limits (voltage collapse), unexpected
reduction of generated power and unexpected increase or
reduction of power required by loads.
• Failures involving the topology of the grid TG: discon-
nection of one or more components, with consequent
separation of the components from the electrical network.
A failure involving TG triggers new values for the electrical
quantities of EI. The topology TG can change as a results
of a failure involving the electrical quantities of EI (e.g., the
protections can disconnect a line when the power flow through
the line is not maintained below a threshold).
The failures of the MCS components can be summarized in
content failures (when the content of the service output deviates
from implementing the component function), timing failures
(when the timing of output delivery deviates from implementing
the component function), halt failure (when the service is halted
and the external output becomes constant) and inconsistent
failure (when some or all component users perceive differently
incorrect service and some users may actually perceive correct
service) [22].
Failures in the MCS impact on the state of the EI, i.e. on
the electrical quantities and on the topology TG, depending
on the components affected by the failures, and obviously by
the type of the failures. The effects of failures of the MCS
components on the overall EI could be:
• wrong application of a reconfiguration, either when
effectively required or a spurious one,
• delayed/omitted application of a reconfiguration when
necessary (timing or halt failure).
For example, a logical controller LC affected by content
failure applies set points with erroneous random values to
the controlled component. Failures of the component LC can
also impact on the input values (including the information
on the state of EI) that the components LV GC (or MVGC)
receive from LC. These values can be omitted, delayed (or
anticipated) or erroneous. Since, reconfigurations required by
LV GC (or MVGC or CSY S) are actuated by the associated
logical controllers LC, a failure of a component LC can
also impact on the reconfigurations required by LV GC (or
MVGC or CSY S). The failure of the components CSY S,
MVGC or LV GC corresponds to an erroneous (request of)
reconfiguration of the state of the EI (including a non-needed
reconfiguration or no reconfiguration) affecting one or more
components of the controlled area. The effect of the failure
of CSY S, MVGC or LV GC on a component controlled by
LC is the same as the failure of the component LC associated
to the controlled component. In the case of inconsistent failure,
these effects can be different for each controlled component.
The components affected by an inconsistent failure can be
selected by a random variable. In general, the failure of the
components CSY S, MVGC or LV GC may depend on the
failures of the components connected to them by a network. The
(content, timing or halt) failure of a communication network
AN connecting LV GC and different LC has the same effect
of the (content, timing or halt) failure of the LV GC. Although,
the time to occurrence of the failure and the repair time for
LV GC and AN are usually different.
Based on the criteria presented in [22], two classes of faults
are defined:
• malicious faults (malicious logic faults and intrusion at-
tempts): human-made faults, introduced with the malicious
objective to alter the functioning of the system during use.
• accidental faults: non-malicious faults caused by mistakes
or by natural phenomena without human partecipation.
Accidental faults are considered for both the EI and MCS.
Whereas, malicious faults are only considered for MCS.
Accidental fault can occorring directly in the EI (e.g., a
power line broken by a fallen tree), or it can be caused
by an accidental or malicious fault occurred in the MCS
(e.g., erroneous configuration due to an attack of the primary
substation controller that generates the trip of a power line).
Accidental faults may also directly affect the MCS, producing
the failure of one or more entities of the MCS, e.g., the weather
forecast system included in the logical component CSY S or
the control communication network associated to an MVGC,
corresponding to a logical component WAN . Failures of the
MCS can be caused by random faults of the EI (as result of a
blackout in the area where the MCS components are located),
leading to service degradation or failure [23].
Malicious attacks considered in the model are cyber attacks
(e.g., flooding based DoS and fake messages) to the control
components, e.g., cyber attack to CSY S, MVGC, LV GC,
LC, WAN and AN , involving the main control functions
and their communications. Malicious attacks to MCS can
result in delayed/missing data or fake data about measurements,
forecasts, set points, etc., thus conveying incorrect informations
in the control flow. The impact of cyber attacks on the supplied
power depends on: the electrical network size, the amount of
distributed generation, the control network topology and the
extension of the attack effect [11].
As already shown above, due to the strong interconnection
between EI and MCS, a failure in EI propagates to MCS and
vice versa (interdependencies), possibly resulting in cascading
or escalating failure III. The hybrid-state of EI changes when
occurs one of the following events: fault, voltage/var regulation
or reconfiguration action by MCS (including erroneous, delayed
or not required action) and maintenance actions. MCS actions
that change the state of EI can be correctly actived by an
event in the EI, or can be erroneously activated by a failure of
the MCS. The discrete-state of MCS can change when occurs
one of the following events: failure of a component of MCS,
recovery from a failure in MCS, fault in EI. Interdependencies
from MCS to EI occur, for example, when due to a content
failure of MCS a power line could be erroneously open,
leading to a disconnection of a part of the electrical network.
Interdependencies from EI and MCS occur, for example, when a
failure in the EI causes a blackout that reduces the performance
of the private or public networks used by MCS, or isolates part
of the MCS. Interdependencies from EI and MCS to EI occur,
for example, when: a) the MCS fails and does not remove
an overload of a power line, the overloaded line open or fails
and the topology changes, other lines are overloaded and the
disruption propagates; b) the MCS fails and does not control
the voltage raising (due to intermittence of renewable units),
the voltage upper limit is reached, the generator protection
trips, other DG units on the same area will sense the same
problem, also their protection trips leading to a sudden voltage
drop and the disruption propagates to a set of contiguous EI
components, aggravating even more this problem [18].
IV. METRICS UNDER EVALUATION
The resilience of a SG system can be evaluated in terms
of a variety of measures of interest to final customers, service
providers and operators. Especially, blackout-related indicators,
as well as performability [24] related ones are among those
we consider in our stochastic model based analysis, as listed
in the following.
• The percentages UD(t) and UD(0, t) of undelivered
power (the undelivered power divided by the power
demand) for the whole grid (o for the load i) at time
t or in the interval [0, t], respectively.
• The number of hours of undelivered power demand to
load i, UDHi , or for the whole grid, UD
H , from the time
of disruption (or time 0) until the restoration of the correct
state of the power system (that is, after the repair of all
the failed components, condition required for all power
demand to be met). These measures do not express the
loss of power demand in terms of absolute values of power
unit, e.g., MW (MegaWatt), but rather in terms of hours of
undelivered power demand (until the repair of all the failed
components, whose time represents the maximum number
of hours of power demand loss that can be experienced).
Thus, they provide a intuitive quantification of the loss
of power demand that is independent from a reference
time window for the analysis, and generalize the measures
defined in previous item [25].
• A reward measures Y (t) and Y (0, t) at time t or in the
interval [0, t], respectively, based on a reward structure
where costs and rewards are considered with respect to the
point of the view of the power producers and distributors:
◦ Costs are associated to power generators, depending on:
the quantity of required/produced power, the type of
generator, the fault of the generator and the time t.
◦ Rewards are associated to satisfied loads, depending on:
the quantity of required/consumed power, the criticality
of the load, the time t.
◦ Costs are associated to each interruption of service,
depending on: the difference between the required power
and the available power for each load, the number of
loads which will be powered off, the criticality of loads
which will be powered off, duration of the interruption,
the time t.
• The actual voltage Vh(t), active Ph(t) and Qh(t) reactive
power associated to each electrical component h at time
t.
• The loss of active power, i.e., the difference between the
active power injected by the generators and the active
power absorbed by the loads, at time t, P loss(t), or in
the interval [0, t], P loss(0, t).
• The number of failed components, at time t, or in the
interval [0, t].
For flexible generators and loads, the definition of undelivered
power (or power demand that is not met) depends on the
flexibility pattern considered, as described in Section II-D. The
defined measures of interest can be evaluated in terms of mean,
variance or distribution.
V. MODELING AND EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
To model and evaluate the measures of interest introduced
in Section IV we first define a stochastic model representing the
behavior of the SG system at the needed level of detail, then
we define the performance (or reward) variables representing
the measures of interest and finally we evaluate the measures
by simulation.
A. Important Aspects of the Smart Grid
The modeling and evaluation framework should be able to
represent the following structural and behavioral aspects of the
SG systems.
1) Structural Aspects of the Smart Grid: The SG system has
a natural hierarchical structure, as shown in the logical schemes
of Figures 3 and 4. At a certain level of detail, the system is
composed by many similar components having the same logical
structure, as shown, for example, in Figures 1c and 2 for the
power lines (arcs) and for the logical components medium-
voltage and low-voltage subtsations (nodes), respectively. Also
different instances of the same component MVGC, LV GC,
LC and WAN and AN , as shown in Figure 3, are assumed
having the same logical structure. These components can be
grouped based on similar sub-components, e.g.: i) all the
substations logically structured as a bus and a generator NG,
ii) or all the substations logically structured as a bus and a load
NL, iii) or all the substations logically structured as a bus, a
generator and a load NGL, etc. All similar components can be
considered non anonymous replicas (e.g., NGi , i = 1, . . . , nG)
having the same structure and different parameter values for
the activities and the events represented. Alternatively, in order
to reduce the number of replicated components and to try to
improve the efficiency of the resultating model in terms of sim-
ulation time, more complex components can be considered for a
replica, like as, for example, the triple NAN : substation, power
line and substation, i.e. NAN = (NODE1, ARC,NODE2),
or, for simplicity, NAN = N1, A,N2, where N1 and N2
represent the starting and ending nodes linked to the power line
represented by direct arc A. All the logical sub-components
defined for NODE and ARC are included in the model, but
disabling (in the final resulting model) all the sub-components
of a specific replica that have not to be considered, because
they are represented by a different replica. In this example, nA
non anonimous replicas of the generic component NAN are
considered, one replica NANl for each arc (or power line) l of
the EI network, being nA the number of lines; if, for example,
only a generator is associated to the NODE1 of the line l,
then in the final model, all the other sub-components of the
NODE1 are (to be) disabled, except (those representing) the
generator and the bus. Following the same approach, also the
control components, like as LC, can be included in NAN , or
can be grouped in replicas modeled reparately.
2) Behavioral Aspects of SG: The time to failures of
the electrical components depends also on the value of the
electrical quantities associated to the components. A failure of a
component can propagate to contiguous components. Depending
on the failure, the propagation time of a failure could be
considered instantaneous. Protections can stop the propagation
of a failure by isolating from the grid the component affected
by a failure. The activation time of a protection should not be
considered instantaneous. The correct activation of a protection
depends also on the “strength” of the failure and on the value of
the electrical parameters associated to the protection component.
The reaction time (with respect to the occurrence of a failure),
the failure time and erroneous activation time (when no failure
is occurred) of a component (e.g., MVGC, LV GC or LC)
should be considered.
Different functions, with the goal of finding an optimal
reconfiguration strategy RS (new set points), should be consid-
ered, including voltage/var control algorithms. These functions
receive in input the values for V , δV , I , P , Q and TG, for
which EI is not in equilibrium (that is, it is not in acceptable
state in terms of costs, voltage, etc.) and outputs the new
values for V , δV , I , P , Q and TG for which the system EI
is in equilibrium (in an acceptable state) and satisfies bounds
and constraints (i.e., load balancing, power loss reduction, load
shedding, generator redispatch, voltage control, reactive power
control, line overload reduction, opening or closing sectioning
switches), if possible.
B. Framework’s Requirements
The main features that a modeling and evaluation framework
should possess for the analysis of SG, are presented with
respect to the following aspects: i) modeling power, i.e., the
basic modeling formalisms needed to build the SG model;
ii) modeling efficiency, i.e. the advanced modeling mechanisms
needed to build the SG model more efficiently; and iii) solution
power, i.e., the ability to provide efficient methods to evaluate
the measures of interest [26].
1) Modeling power: Representation of continuous, discrete
and hybrid states. Time distributions, probability distributions
and conditions enabling the time consuming events that can
depend both on the discrete and on the continuous state. The
call to the functions which describe the effect (in terms of
state changes) of the reconfiguration and voltage/var control
algorithms. Definition of dependability and performability
measures.
2) Modeling efficiency: Hierarchical composition of differ-
ent sub-models based on replication and composition operators.
Replication of anonymous and non anonymous sub-models,
sharing part of the state. Compact representation for the
topology of the grid (for TG), for example, describing a part of
the state of the system in terms of a incidence matrix [nodes
x arcs]. Compact representation of continuous state for the
quantities V , δV , I , P and Q, describing, for example, a part
of the state of the system in term of arrays, associating to each
component of EI the corresponding values for V , δV , I , P and
Q (if any).
3) Solution power: To manage complexity at solution level
(like explosion of the states of the model, stiffness and non
exponential distributions), ability to perform simulations.
C. On the Construction of the Overall SG Model with Mo¨bius
In this Section we address the problem of building the over-
all modeling framework based on a modular and compositional
approach and on the logical schemes proposed in Section II.
Although the proposed approach is not related to a specific
tool, in order to show how it can be concretely realized, we
describe it in terms of a few basic modeling formalisms and
mechanisms supported by the tool Mo¨bius, a powerful multi-
formalism/multisolution tool [27]. The software tool Mo¨bius
supports: i) multiple high-level modelling formalisms (SAN,
ADVISE, FaultTree, etc.), ii) multiple solution techniques
(including simulations), iii) construction of composed models
from previously defined models, iv) hierarchical approach to
modelling based on state-sharing, v) Join/Rep state-sharing
composition node used to compose/replicate submodels, vi) C++
code to define the primitives of the models, as well as custom
functions implementing, for example, the required RS. We
have selected the SAN and ADVISE formalisms, to model,
respectively: i) the stochastic process representing the SG
system, and ii) the attack steps an attacker would execute in
order to gain new knowledge or access or to achieve new goals,
and the adversary profile defining the qualities and interests of
an attacker.
The process of constructing the model of a complex system
like a SG, based on the manual definition of a lot of submodels,
can be very expensive in terms of time and very error prone. The
modeling process could be automatized, defining an automated
procedure which receives in input the parameters describing
the SG (including the topology, the components associated
to each node and arc of EI, and the control system MCS),
and generates the hierarchical composed model representing
the SG. We use an alternative modular and compositional
approach, inspired to that proposed in [28] for the electrical
transmission networks. It aims to develop a generic and
hierarchical composed model based on the composition and
replication of template models linked together through sharing
of state variables of each model. The overall model represents
different smart grid configurations, being input parameters: both
the electrical grid topology (represented by a graph) and the
components (generators, loads, OLTC, LC, MVGC, LVGC, etc)
associated to each node/substation of the grid. With respect to
the approach proposed in [28], our approach:
• It copes with the greater complexity due to volatile
microgrid generation, flexible generation and loads and
newly appliances to control and manage distribution of
electricity,
• It simplifies the representation of the dependencies be-
tween contiguous components (e.g., nodes and lines of the
EI network), thus reducing the complexity of the model
and improving the efficiency of the resultating model in
terms of simulation time: in [28] the propagation of a fault
(e.g., a lightning) through neighboring nodes and lines is
explicitely represented by movement of tokens through
places of different SAN, triggered by enabling conditions
of activities based on the marking of the neighboring
components. But here, this type of dependencies are
represented, at higher level of abstraction, by single atomic
C++-based reconfiguration actions implemented in the
primitives of the SAN, that set a new configurations of
the involved components, without triggering a sequence
of SAN activities (transitions). Thus, in our approch, the
protection mechanism (that, when a fault occurs in an
electrical component, triggers the trip of the neighboring
components) is not explicitely modeled by the firing of
a sequence of SAN activities, but as a result of a single
reconfiguration action, that also accounts for the failures
of the protection devices.
• It reduces the number of replicated components, by
considering more complex logical component for each non
anonimous replica. This aims to reduce the simulation time
of the model, that, in Mo¨bius, is influenced by the number
of replicas and by the complexity of the dependencies of
a replica by the state of the other replicas.
The proposed framework is based on templates, i.e., atomic
or composed generic model identified as building block. A
template represents a group of similar components having:
i) the same logical structure, and ii) different parameter
values for the activities and the events represented. A specific
component of the group represented by a template is defined
by non anonymous indexed replicas of the template [28].
Parameters and states of a generic component are defined,
respectively, by (C++) global arrays and array extended places,
having one entry for each replica of the template. Each entry
of these arrays represents the parameters and the state of a
specific component. By applying an index to these arrays, each
replica of a template can access to the parameters and the state
of the other replicas of the same template, and, if needed, to
the parameters and the state of the replicas of other templates.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5. Composed models representing the overall SG (a) and MV-MCS and
MV-EI (b).
The overall model is obtained by the composition, using
the join operator, of the three submodels shown in Figure 5a:
CMCS, MV MCS EI and LV MCS EI; they represent the 3
hierarchical levels of the logical architecture shown in Figure 3.
The model MV MCS EI is obtained composing the sub-
models MV MCS and MV EI representing, respectively, MV-
MCS and MV-EI, as shown in Figure 5b.
The construction of the MV EI model, representing a
topology like that shown in Figure 1b, with n nodes and m
arc, comprises the following steps:
1) To define the template models N1, N2 and A, representing
the logical components, shown in Figures 2 and 1c,
associated to nodes and lines of the network. These
(a) (b)
Fig. 6. Composed models representing the template model for a generic
node (a) and for MV-EI (b).
models are obtained by composing the SAN atomic models
representing each single component, as shown for N1 in
Figure 6a (for the sake of simplicity, only a subset of the
components is considered).
2) To define the hierarchical template model N1AN2, rep-
resenting a generic arc A of the MV-EI network with the
associated starting N1 and ending N2 nodes, as described
in Section V-A1. The model N1AN2 is a hierarchical
model generated by composing the submodels N1, N2,
and A, as shown in Figure 6b.
3) To define the hierarchical model MV EI by automatically
replicating m times, one replica for each arc, the template
model N1AN2, using the rep operator, and assigning at
each replica a different index, from 1 to m. The index of
each replicas is modeled in the template SAN model PL -
SAN (representing a generic power line and composing
the model A) through a place AIndex, that is defined
at time 0, before enabling the activities representing the
behavior of the components. The place AIndex is local to
each replica of N1AN2, but it is shared between all the
atomic SAN composing the model N1AN2.
A part of the state of each replica can be represented by
the i-th entry of an array extended place of m elements/entries
(one element for each replica). Each entry can be a C++ plain
type (int, real, struct, etc.) or a more complex user defined
type. For example, the voltage on the starting node (bus) of
the arc (power line) l is represented by the double-type l-th
entry V 1–>Index(l)–>Mark() of the array place V 1. The
reactive power on the capacitor bank associated to the node
N1 of the arch l is modeled by the double-of-struct-type l-
th entry P1–>Index(l)–>CB–>Mark() of the array place
P1 (CB is the member of the struct type associated to each
entry). These array places are shared between the replicas, thus
a replica can access to the state of the other replicas. The
parameters and the behavior (marking changes) of each replica
can depend on the index of the replica, on the state of the
other replicas and on the topology TG. The definition of TG,
for the current configuration of SG, is represented by C++ data
structures, statically defined at compilation time. The state of
TG, representing for example a power line disconnected due to
a fault, is represented by array places with m entries, one for
each line, like openLines, faultyLines, faultyNode1, etc.
Which sub-models are enabled for each replica, depends
on the topology TG. For example, if a node i of the network
is the starting node of the arcs l1 and l2, then only one of
the two sub-models N1,l1 and N1,l2 of the replica NLNl is
enabled. All the atomic SAN composing a specific replica (i.e,
an instance of the model MV EI) that have not to be considered
in the final resulting model (depending of the specific MV-EI
network) are permanently disabled, by disabling the enabling
conditions of all the activities included in the SAN models;
for example, all the enabling conditions in the atomic models
representing a component associated to a node N1 connected
to the line l are extended by the C++ logical condition &&
enabled[l].n1, where the parameter enabled[l].n1 is defined at
compilation time, when the solver is generated for a specific
configuration of the modeled SG.
Each SAN atomic model is a template that can represent the
main characteristics described in Section II-D for the modeled
component. For example, the volatility of a DER due to the
weather conditions can be modeled in the SAN DG SAN like
a stochastic process alternating different states of the DER: off
(generator is not active), low (generated power is low), medium
(generated power is medium) and high (generated power is
high); the time spent in each state can be represented by random
distributions. Same weather conditions can be modeled for
a group of DER located on different nodes, by introducing
dependencies between the involved SAN models; dependencies
can be defined by synchronizing the activities (transitions) of
different SAN on a same shared state. Prediction of power
production can be considered in terms of a random error state
with respect to the actual production and time spent in each state:
none, low, medium or high error. A cost (for example, a higher
power loss) can be modeled for each prediction error, because
the set points are no more optimal, being based on a weather
condition different from the current one. Consequently, also the
triggering of new reconfiguration actions for each new erroenous
state can be modeled in the SAN model, through state sharing
between DG SAN and MV MCS model. Similar approaches
can be considered to model random power demand flexibility
in the atomic model FL SAN. In particular, random charging
demands of arriving electrical vehicles and their assignment
to the charging stations, based on the state of EI and the
control policies can be represented by a SAN model in term
of stochastic process based on a client/server approach (where
the loads are servers of random requests of charging).
Using the same approach, it is possible to construct the
composed model MV-MCS shown in Figure 7. The atomic
Fig. 7. Composed models representing the template model for MV-MCS.
SAN models LC SAN, MVGC SAN and WAN SAN are the
templates representing, respectively, a generic logical controller
LC, a generic MVGC and the associated WAN communication
network connecting MVGC and LC. The atomic ADVISE
models LC ADVISE and MVGC ADVISE are the templates
representing the adversary profile and the steps to attacks,
respectively, LC and MVGC. As shown in Figure 7, these
models are composed with the operators join and rep, to
obtain np replicas of the template MVGC WAN ATTACK,
one replica for each MVGC, and nLC replicas of the template
LC ATTACK, one replica for each LC.
In isolated mode, a replica of LC SAN models the local
control functions/actions performed by an LC to reconfigure the
set points of the EI component associated to the LC, depending
on the state of the LC. A C++ function controlledComponent(int
LCIndex) is statically defined at compilation time to identify
the component associated to the replica of LC SAN with index
LCIndex. This function is used to identify the entry of the
shared array places of the model MV EI representing the
state (including the values for the set points) of the controlled
component, that must be updated.
A replica of MVGC SAN models the control func-
tions/actions performed by an MVGC to reconfigure the set
points of all the EI components controlled by the MVGC, de-
pending on the state of the MVGC. In particular, MVGC SAN
models the condition triggering a control action, the reaction
delay (that also depends on the state of the associated WAN),
and the evaluation of the reconfiguration strategy (that depends
on the states of the controlled EI components, of the associated
LC and of the involved communication networks), the attacks
to the MVGC and to the WAN and their effetcs. In order to
support voltage/var control algorithms, MVGC SAN model
can implement different mixed non-linear optimization problem
with bounds and constraints.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has addressed the stochastic modeling and
analysis of Smart Grid systems, to assess indicators useful
to quantify the resilience degree of the system. Given the
complexity and the size of the tackled problem, the work
described here sets the basis towards fulfilling the final
objective, that is building a generic, modular and compasable
modeling framework for SG evaluation. In particular, the steps
accomplished so far include: i) definition of the logical structure
of the SG, by identifying its main logical components both at
grid and control level; ii) characterization of these components
in terms of their state and relationships; iii) definition of a
fault model appropriate for the targeted system and a set
of relevant resilience-related indicators for the analysis; iv)
discussion and identification of the approach to build the
modeling framework, with preliminary exemplifications using
the SAN formalism. The activities currently in progress as
extension of the work presented in this paper go in the direction
of: i) implementing the template models as outlined in the last
Section, for both the grid components and the attack steps;
ii) finding efficient-enough solutions to model the voltage/var
control algorithms implemented by the MCS subsystem; iii)
select relevant scenarios (e.g., the use cases adopted by the
SmartC2Net project) to exercise the modeling framework and
practically demonstrate its usefulness and generality.
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